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Abstract : 
 
We investigate whether "binding agreements" can provide a solution to the social dilemma 
that arises in the presence of pure public goods. By signing a binding agreement, players can 
prevent free riding by the contributors to a public good. However, a well known theoretical 
result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily 
efficient. In our setting, the individual level of contribution to the public good increases with 
the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global coalition is always the socially 
optimal structure. Agreements form sequentially and the equilibrium outcome is an 
asymmetric structure, which consists of two coalitions. Our experiment therefore lends force 
to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient. In fact, we observe an outcome 
which is even less efficient than that predicted by the equilibrium agreement structure. 
However, it seems that when subjects reach agreements they do so with the intention of 
cooperating rather than free riding. Furthermore, it seems that they “learn to cooperate” over 
time and reach the global agreement more often towards the end of sessions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
A standard result in economic theory is that public goods will generally be provided at a level 
which is lower than, and Pareto inferior to, the socially optimum amount. In the absence of 
well-designed incentives, agents try to free ride on the contribution of others. If this behaviour 
is widespread in a community of agents, voluntary contributions will generally be insufficient 
to produce the optimal amount of public goods. However it has been shown in experiments 
that the outcome may not be so poor as that predicted by theory. 
 
Experiments involving voluntary contributions to a public good have produced robust stylised 
facts about the average level of contribution and its evolution with repetition. On average 
subjects contribute a larger share of their endowment to the public good than predicted under 
the assumptions of rational and selfish behaviour. The stylised facts that emerge from the 
numerous experiments for the standard type of environment 3 is that the average contribution 
is about half the endowment in the first period, and declines with the repetition of the game 
towards the Nash equilibrium level of contribution, without, however, reaching this level (see 
Ledyard (1995) and Laury & Holt for a survey of this literature). 
 
While cooperation appears to be prevalent in the early stages of the game, many subjects 
seem to become less cooperative over time and even end up free riding completely on the 
contributions of the others. Individual contribution behaviour appears therefore to be largely 
determined by the observation of past contributions by other group members as well as their 
own past contributions. Indeed, a large fraction of subjects appear to contribute conditionally 
(Keser & van Winden, 2000), and few subjects only act unconditionally without adpating 
their behaviour over time, remaining either cooperative the whole time or always acting as a 
free rider. In recent years research has focused on ways to improve or sustain cooperation in 
public goods games. Fehr & Gächter (2000) made an important step by showing that, if free 
riding behaviour can be punished, there is a marked increase in the average level of 
contribution. Therefore the threat of individual sanctions, may create sufficient discipline to 
remove the temptation for agents to free ride.    
                                                 
3 Yet, most of the available experimental evidence has been obtained for quite particular environments, for 
which the amount of public good is the output of a linear production technology, i.e. exhibiting constant 
marginal returns. In particular, public goods games with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, assume that the 
amount of public good is a linear function of the total contribution of the group. 
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 While this opens an important research avenue, in practice individual contributions are often 
unobservable. For example, many donators to charities prefer to remain anonymous, a fact 
that is well accepted by the community. More important is the fact that complete observability 
of individual contributions may be too costly to be implemented. For example tax evasion 
cannot be eliminated completely since costly inspections are limited by the authorities' budget 
constraint. Even in situations where individual contributions are observable at a reasonable 
cost, punishment is not necessarily feasible. For these reasons it is worth exploring other tools 
that can improve the level of cooperation and contribution to the public good within a 
community of agents.  
 
In this paper we investigate a new mechanism that can lead to higher contribution levels in an 
experimental game of contribution to a pure public good: binding agreements. In contrast to 
voluntary contributions, under a binding agreement players have to make a commitment to a 
fixed level of contribution. The commitment can be made by several players who decide to 
sign an agreement. International environmental treaties constitute an obvious example. 
However, in the case of the negotiation on global warming, there is an ongoing debate. On the 
one hand there are those countries which favour voluntary contributions and these include the 
United States and certain developing countries like China and, on the other hand there are 
those such as the European Union, in favour of a binding agreement which specifies targets 
and time table.  
In the theoretical literature, the old debate about the necessity and the efficiency of binding 
agreements has been revived in the last 20 years. The problem of public goods and 
externalities has been analyzed by economists in the framework of Samuelson's public good 
theory (1954) or as developments of the Coase theorem (1961). The Coase Theorem explains 
how partners can reach an efficient outcome by bargaining, when they can sign a binding 
agreement at the end. The new theory of coalition formation explained how the existence of 
these externalities or spillovers could lead to inefficient outcomes. Even when the players 
have the possibility to sign a global agreement, they may fail to reach this efficient outcome 
and sign sub-global agreements. This is the problem of participation in agreements. 
 
The numerous contributions to this literature converge towards the same result, but differ in 
the form of games used to model coalition or agreement formation. One part of this literature 
uses normal form games which are reduced form models, useful when the objective is not the 
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analysis of the emergence of agreements but the analysis of their stability. The first ancestral 
exclusive membership game was proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) in their 
seminal book which marked the beginning of game theory. Later, Hart and Kurz (1983) 
proposed a variation of the same model. At the same time, D’Aspremont et al. (1983) 
proposed a simpler game with an open-membership rule, which opened the way for numerous 
applications to industrial organization (the overabundant theory of stable cartels4) and 
environmental economics (Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Hoel and Schneider 
(1997),…). A parallel literature uses extensive form games which allow one to describe, some 
aspects of the bargaining leading to the agreement. See for example Bloch (1996), or Ray and 
Vohra (1999), (2001). Finally, another part of the literature deals specifically with the 
complexity of farsightedness in a sequential framework. See for example Chew (1994) or Xue 
(1998).  
 
In this paper, we adopt the extensive form game approach. We rely on the model of Ray and 
Vohra (2001) in which the players can reach agreement by making proposals and counter-
proposals sequentially. At each period of time, one player can propose an agreement 
involving each of the players who would be required to sign. If the proposed agreement is 
accepted by all potential members the agreement is definitely created. If one of the potential 
members rejects the offer, he has to make a new proposal. The process continues until each 
agent belongs to an agreement. Then, the agents have to contribute to a pure public good and 
those who have reached an agreement contribute the amount which maximizes the sum of 
their partners’ and their own payoffs, given what is decided by the other groups. When the 
game is symmetric, this leads to situations in which all agents who accept to sign an 
agreement have to contribute the same amount to the public good. This amount increases with 
the number of agents who sign an agreement. Individual contributions are therefore more 
costly in large agreements and the total amount of public good provided depends on the 
structure of agreements. For this reason the social dilemma is not completely eliminated since 
there is an incentive for small agreements to free ride on larger ones. Since the individual 
level of contribution is increasing with the size of the agreement, there is an incentive for 
players to stay alone, or to join few partners in order to free ride on existing bigger 
agreements. On the other hand, since the amount of public good depends on the size 
distribution of the agreements, there is an incentive to build up larger groups. There are two 
                                                 
4 See for example Donsimoni (1985), Donsimoni, Economides and Polemarchakis (1986), Thoron (1998).  
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extreme structures which could emerge: the global agreement and the set of singletons. In this 
setting, the global agreement corresponds to a social optimum in the sense that it leads always 
to the most efficient outcome. In contrast, the set of singletons leads to the worst social 
outcome. However, Ray and Vohra show that, at the equilibrium of their game, several sub-
global agreements can co-exist. Given the parameters we have chosen, the equilibrium 
structure of agreements is an asymmetric structure with two agreements, in which the smaller 
group free rides on the larger one. Since the equilibrium structure of agreements differs from 
the set of singletons, binding agreements increase the level of cooperation in the population. 
 
We present the result of an experiment based on Ray and Vohra’s (2001) game. Our 
experiment compares two protocols of agreement formation: the veto treatment and the 
dictator treatment, which are equivalent from the theoretical point of view. In the veto 
treatment, which corresponds to the agreement formation game described above, those 
individuals who are proposed as members of an agreement can reject the proposal. In contrast, 
in the dictator treatment, they are obliged to become  members of the proposed agreement. 
The equilibrium prediction is the same for the two protocols. With our choice of parameters 
there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium agreement in which a small coalition free rides on a 
large coalition.  
 
We found strong evidence of both cooperative and free riding behaviour. Our experiment 
supports the theoretical result that the formation of binding agreements leads to inefficient 
outcomes. We obtain an even worse outcome than that predicted by the equilibrium 
agreement structure. Indeed, our data shows that the equilibrium outcome is almost never 
observed. In contrast, the analysis of proposals in sub-games shows that most proposals 
correspond either to the global agreement or to a structure that incorporates many singletons. 
It seems that the subjects do not reach agreements to free ride but only to cooperate. 
Furthermore, they “learn to cooperate” over time and reach the global agreement more often 
towards the end of sessions. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the extensive game of 
coalition formation under positive externalities. The game is solved assuming the rationality 
of players adopted in Ray and Vohra’s paper. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. 
Section 4 presents our main findings about the realized agreements (4.1) and the proposed 
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agreements (4.2), which differ only for the veto treatment. Section 5 is a discussion of 
different interpretations of the experimental results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2-1 The sequential game of agreement formation 
 
We consider a two-stage model of sequential formation of binding agreements. In a first 
stage, n identical players have the possibility to sign binding agreements. The outcome is a 
partition of the set of players. In the second stage of the game, the players voluntary 
contribute to a public good. The players who have signed the same agreement choose the 
contributions which maximize the sum of the partners’ utilities, given the decision taken by 
the signatories of the other agreements. 
 
The first stage of the agreement formation game is drawn from Bloch (1995), (1996) and Ray 
and Vohra (1999), (2001). They propose a sequential game of agreement formation based on 
a bargaining game à la Rubinstein (1986) and Stähl (1972). Let N denotes a set of players. A 
protocol designs the order in which the players in N enter into the game to make a proposal or 
to give an answer to somebody else’s proposal. A proposal by player  is an agreement 
 to which she belongs and which is characterized by the members' names and a sharing 
of the agreement's payoff. The agreement can only be signed if the different members have 
sequentially accepted the proposal. If one member refuses, she has to make another proposal. 
If they have all accepted, the agreement is signed and the game continues with the players 
who have not reached an agreement yet. Once an agreement is signed its membership cannot 
be modified; in other words, there is no renegotiation. The outcome is an agreement structure 
π = (S
Ni∈
NS⊂
1,...,Sm), or, in other words, a partition of the set of players, which means that each 
player signs one and only one agreement. Formally,  
Ο/=∩=/=∀ lk SSlkmlk   ,  ,,...,1, and . kmk S1=U
 
This game is an extensive form game whose sub-games start each time a player has to make a 
proposal. Therefore, for each partition of each sub-set of players , denoted by B(T), 
and for each player 
NT ⊂
∈i N\T designated by the protocol to make a proposal, we can define a 
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sub-game denoted by . Players in N\T, player i and his potential partners, have not 
reached an agreement yet and are the “active” players in this sub-game. If all the players in 
N\T reach an agreement, we will say that the largest agreement is reached in the sub-game 
. If the largest agreement is reached at the beginning of the game, that is in a sub-game 
, we will say that the global agreement is reached. 
i
TBG )(
i
TBG )(
i
OBG )( /
 
When the game is symmetric and the players all identical, the net benefit generated by a given 
agreement Sk ⊂ N, in a given agreement structure π = (S1,...,Sm), only depends on the number 
of signatories of each agreement, element of the structure. Bloch (1996) proved that, in that 
case, the sequential game of agreement formation is equivalent to a simpler game in which 
each player designated by the protocol chooses a number of partners and the agreement is 
immediately signed. Indeed, the interests of the player who makes a proposal coincide with 
those of the partners she chooses and who are in the same position. The outcome of the game 
is then an ordered sequence of agreement sizes which sum to n, the total number of players. 
Ray and Vohra (1999) proved that the endogenous sharing rule in each agreement is then the 
equalitarian sharing of the net benefit generated among the signatories. 
 
2.2 Positive externalities 
 
Payoffs are generated in the second stage of the game. Ray and Vohra (2001) refer to a model 
of pollution control. Think for example that a set of partners have signed a binding agreement 
to improve the quality of air. In order to decrease pollution, they have to decrease their 
production or to adopt new technologies and this is costly. Let z denote the public benefit of 
control activity pursued by any particular partner. Let c(z) be the private cost generated by 
this control activity. We assume that this cost function is quadratic: c(z) = (1/2)z². The payoff 
to partner i is then: 
∑
=
−=
n
j
ijni )z(cz)z,...,z(u
1
1  
For a given partition of the set of individual players N into m binding agreements π = 
(S1,...,Sm), the signatories of each agreement Si of size si decide the amount of pollution 
control each member has to produce zi, given the effort of the other agreements' signatories: 
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This is a non-cooperative game in which the new players are now the m binding agreements. 
At the Nash equilibrium of this game, each partner of an agreement of size si produces an 
amount si of pollution control and enjoys a payoff: 
∑
=
−=
m
j
ijmi ss)s,...,s(u
1
22
1 2
1  
This payoff function generates positive externalities. This means two things. First, for a given 
structure of agreements, the signatories of small agreements get more than the signatories of 
large agreements. Secondly, for a given agreement, its signatories are better off if other 
agreements “merge”. As a consequence, for a given player, the best situation is the agreement 
structure in which she does not sign any agreement while all the other players sign a unique 
agreement of size n – 1. When the whole set of individual players in N sign the global 
agreement, the different partners share equally the collective optimum, which is 22n . 
However, in this situation, each partner would prefer not to sign the agreement in order to free 
ride on the other signatories. Two opposite forces are at stake. Individual players have an 
incentive to sign agreements with many signatories in order to efficiently control pollution. At 
the same time, each individual player has an incentive to free ride and would prefer the other 
players to sign the agreement without her participation.  
 
2.3 Farsighted players 
 
If the players are farsighted, as it is assumed in Ray and Vohra (2001), a unique Nash 
equilibrium of the sequential model of agreement formation is determined by backward 
induction. Let us again consider the symmetrical case. Ray and Vohra show that the global 
agreement is not necessarily reached. Furthermore, if several sub-global agreements emerge, 
they appear in size-increasing order. Consider for example, an original set of seven players. 
At the unique equilibrium, an agreement between two players is signed first, followed by the 
signature of another agreement by five other players. The smaller group "free rides" therefore 
on the contributions of the larger group.  
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Let us see how this happens. Players are farsighted and the game is solved by backward 
induction. The simplicity of the following argument is a consequence of the linearity of the 
payoff function. Each decision about the size of the agreement to sign does not depend on the 
agreements already signed, but depends only on the number of players who did not take a 
decision yet.  
 
Consider a sub-game  such that a structure of agreements B has already been reached. 
Then, we denote by g(B) the public good contributed by the sub-set of players T who have 
signed one of the B-agreements. If there is only one player remaining, N\T = {i}, of course she 
forms a singleton and gets: u
i
TBG )(
i(B,1) = g(B) + 1/2. If there are two players left, N\T = {i,j},  the 
first player required to take a decision compares two possibilities: 
1) Staying alone, in which case her payoff will be ui (B, 1,1) = g(B) + 3/2. 
2) Signing an agreement with another player to get ui (B, 2) = g(B) + 2. 
As a consequence, she signs an agreement with the other player who accepts because he gets 
more tand the stand alone payoff. 
If there are three players remaining, the first player who needs to take a decision compares 
three possibilities: 
1) Staying alone and anticipating that the two other players will sign an 
agreement, in which case her payoff will be ui (B, 1,2) = f(B) + 4,5. 
2) Signing an agreement with another player, ui (B, 2, 1) = f(B) + 3 
3) Signing an agreement with the two other players, ui (B, 3) = f(B) + 4,5 
and she proposes an agreement to the two other players (assuming that the larger agreement 
will be chosen whenever there is payoff equality between several agreement structures). The 
same reasoning applies until the first player who is perfectly farsighted and anticipates the 
decisions of the following players as previously described. If n = 7, the equilibrium outcome 
is an agreement structure B* = (2, 5). 
  
In fact, this equilibrium depends on three assumptions about the players’ behaviour. The 
players’ farsightedness allows them to anticipate all the subsequent actions of the other 
players. However, this is not sufficient to apply backward induction. A second necessary 
assumption is that all the players are selfish maximizers, i.e. individual payoff maximisers. 
The last assumption is that players’ rationality is common knowledge. We will denote these 
three assumptions about the players’ rationality as follows: 
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Assumption A1: Selfishness  
Assumption A2: Farsightedness 
Assumption A3: Homogeneity 
We will refer to individuals having the rationality generated by these three assumptions as 
having R&V’s behaviour and being R&V’s players. 
 
 
3. Experimental design 
 
Our experiment compares two theoretically equivalent protocols for agreement formation: the 
veto treatment and the dictator treatment. In the veto treatment subjects selected to become a 
partner of a proposed agreement can reject the offer, in which case a new proposal is made by 
another subject. In the dictator treatment subjects that are selected to become a partner of a 
proposed agreement cannot refuse. Therefore, in the dictator treatment the number of 
proposals in a round is always equal to the number of final coalitions, whereas in the veto 
treatment the number of observed proposals is generally larger than the number of final 
coalitions of the realized structure of agreements. We therefore need to analyse the veto 
treatment, to study rejected offers. separately Each independent group of subjects played the 
agreement game for several rounds to allow for learning. The number of repetitions in each 
independent group was random. The subjects knew that an additional round would be played 
with some probability. As a result, the number of rounds differs across independent groups. In 
addition to our main treatment variable “veto versus dictator”, we compare for each treatment 
fixed groups with randomly matched groups. In fixed groups the group of subjects remains 
the same in all rounds. In randomly matched groups, subjects are assigned randomly to a new 
group of players after each round. We thought that fixed groups could behave differently, 
because subjects may react to previously observed agreements in their group. For example, a 
subject who is disappointed by previous agreements could be inclined to act in a more selfish 
way in future rounds, if he is selected to make a proposal. This effect can even become 
stronger in the dictator treatment. We collected 8 independent groups of subjects for the veto 
treatment (6 fixed, 2 random) and 7 independent groups for the dictator treatment (5 fixed, 2 
random). In each session, 14 participants played the agreement game, and were divided into 
groups of seven subjects. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. Note that the number 
of rounds in sessions for random groups is larger because we counted this type of session as a 
single independent observation. The number of rounds of course is equal to the number of 
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observed final agreements, except for random groups for which the number of rounds must be 
multiplied by 2. Table 1 indicates the number of observed proposals in each group. Of course 
the number of proposals is smaller for groups in the dictator treatment, since proposals cannot 
be rejected.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
The experiment was carried out using standard procedures. We developed a specific computer 
program for running the experiment. Our experimental procedure follows closely the protocol 
described in Ray and Vohra’s model. In each period, one of the subjects who does not yet 
belong to an agreement is randomly selected to make a new proposal. A proposal consists 
simply in stating an agreement size. The members assigned to the agreement are chosen 
randomly among the players who do not yet belong to an agreement, and are privately 
informed that they have been selected. 
 
In the veto treatment subjects must state privately if they agree or not to sign the agreement. If 
all of them accept the proposal, the agreement is signed. On the other hand, if one of the 
assigned players rejects the offer, he will have to submit a new proposal. If more than one 
player rejects the offer, one of them will be selected randomly to make a new proposal. Our 
procedure differs slightly from the theoretical procedure, where the proposed members are 
asked sequentially whether or not they accept to become a member of the proposed 
agreement. Under the sequential protocol the first player who rejects the offer is the one that 
makes a new proposal. To gather more data about subjects’ reactions to proposed agreements, 
we chose instead to ask all the proposed members to answer simultaneously. In case of a 
rejection, subjects only knew that the proposed agreement was rejected without knowing by 
how many subjects5. Does the difference between the experimental design and the theory 
affect the subjects’ incentives in the game? It may be the case that a subject’s incentive to 
reject be affected by the fact that he cannot be sure that he will be the one who makes the next 
proposal. However, whether this uncertainty increases or decreases  the incentive to reject is 
unclear.  
 
                                                 
5 Of course a subject who did reject but was not selected to make a new proposal could easily infer that there was 
at least one other subject who rejected. Note that this is also the case in the model. 
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For simplicity let us call "player 1" the subject who makes the first proposal, "player 2" the 
subject who makes the second proposal, and so on. Subjects were told at the beginning that 
they would be randomly assigned to a group of 7 subjects. They could rely on a table showing 
their payoff according to their group size and the final agreement structure (see table 2). Each 
period started by allocating randomly to each subject a "name" chosen from a list of seven 
names {A, B, C, D, E, F, G}. Then, one of the names was selected randomly to be "player 1", 
i.e. the subject who proposes the first group. The decision task was simply to choose an 
integer number between 1 and 7. If the chosen number was equal to one, a singleton was 
formed. If the chosen number was larger than one, the potential partners of the agreement 
were randomly selected among the 6 remaining subjects. Once subjects were selected for 
agreement 1, in the veto treatment they were asked individually whether they accepted or 
rejected this proposal. If all the proposed subjects accepted, the first agreement came into 
force . However,, if one or more subjects rejected the offer, the group was not created. Then 
one of the subjects who decided to reject was selected (randomly) to make a new proposal. 
This process was repeated until each subject was partner to an agreement or a singleton. Once 
all subjects were assigned to an agreement, the period ended and the gains were announced to 
the subjects on their computer screen. The gains were displayed according to agreement size.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
4. Results  
 
 
 4.1 Realized agreements 
  
Figure 1 compares the cumulative frequency distributions of accepted agreements in all 
groups for the random and the fixed group conditions. The null hypothesis of equal frequency 
distributions under the random matching condition and the fixed group condition cannot be 
rejected (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, two-sided, 10%). We decided therefore to pool the data from 
the fixed and the random condition for each treatment.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
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Result 1 : The most frequently realized "agreement" is the singleton.  
 
Figure 2 displays the frequency distribution of accepted agreements for all groups, for the 
veto (2a) and the dictator (2b) treatments. In the veto treatment more than 70% of the realized 
agreements are singletons, compared to 35% for the dictator treatment. However, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of equal size distributions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, two-sided, 1%). 
Since there are many agreement structures that contain at least one singleton (11 out of 15 
possibilities), singletons are more likely to emerge if subjects had decided on a random basis. 
Furthermore, if subjects have a tendency to free ride, they will be tempted to propose small 
agreements where they contribute less. We need therefore to take a closer look at the 
frequencies of realized agreement structures.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
Result 2 : We observe wide variations in the realized agreements structures. The equilibrium 
structure (2,5) is observed 11 times (9.6%) in the dictator treatment and never in the veto 
treatment. The modal structure is the global agreement in both treatments. In the veto 
treatment more than 50% of the agreement structures contain three or more singletons, 
compared to less than 8% in the dictator treatment.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
 
Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution of agreement structures. Few structures (4.5% for 
the veto treatment, 25% for the dictator treatment) involve only two agreements, in contrast to 
the theoretical prediction. The total payoff of the structure has no significant effect on its 
frequency of appearance (see result 4). Furthermore, low payoff structures are quite frequent 
for the veto treatment.  
 
Result 3 : The average gains achieved are higher than  those predicted in the dictator treatment 
and lower than predicted in the veto treatment.  
 
The average performance is equal to 108.19 and 145.17 for the veto and the dictator 
treatment, respectively, a significant difference (Mann-Whitney, one-sided, 1%). These 
numbers correspond to 79.49% and 105.96% respectively of the predicted performance (equal 
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to 137, which corresponds to the performance at the equilibrium (2,5)). Only one of the veto 
groups reaches a better performance than the equilibrium level, and only one of the dictatorial 
groups has a lower performance than the equilibrium prediction. The performance is 
significantly lower than equilibrium performance for the veto treatment (Binomial test, one-
sided, 3.5%) and significantly larger than equilibrium performance for the dictator treatment 
(Binomial test, one-sided, 6.2%). We conclude that binding agreements fail to solve the social 
dilemma in the veto treatment. In contrast, in the dictator treatment, the gap between the 
social optimum performance and the equilibrium performance is reduced by binding 
agreements.  
 
 
Result 4  
Over the 3 last periods the frequency of the global agreement increases in both treatments.  
 
In table 3, we aggregate all agreement structures that contain at least three singletons. We 
compare the frequencies of these agreement structures with the frequency of global 
agreements and the remaining agreement structures (others). The table compares all periods 
with respect to the three last periods. The frequency of the global agreement increases for 
both treatments in the last three periods (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.0547 for the veto 
treatment, p = 0.1094 for the dictator treatment). For the veto treatment we also observe that 
the frequency of agreement structures containing at least 3 singletons decreases.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Result 5 : Agreement structures with low payoff disparity among members are more likely 
to emerge.   
 
Table 4 shows the Gini index associated with each agreement structure and the corresponding 
observed frequencies for each treatment. For the veto treatment the frequencies are 
independent of the corresponding total payoff, in contrast to the dictator treatment. Note that 
for the veto treatment, extreme agreement structures for which the Gini index is close to zero, 
have a high frequency.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
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 We regress the frequency of observed agreement structures, on the corresponding Gini 
coefficient and total payoff of the structure. We include both the Gini index and the squared 
Gini index, to account for the fact that the relation is not necessarily linear. The results are 
summarized in table 5. For both treatments the Gini coefficient is negatively related to  the 
frequency of realized agreements (ranked according to payoff disparity). Furthermore, the 
Gini coefficient has a significant second order effect, which implies that the frequency of 
agreement structures increases when payoff disparity becomes very high. As can be seen from 
table 4, the two agreement structures with the highest Gini index ((1,1,5) and (1,1,1,4)) have a 
relatively high frequency. From table 5, we see that total payoff is highly significant for the 
dictator treatment, but not for the veto treatment. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
 
4.2 Proposed agreements 
 
 
Our preliminary analysis of realized agreements does not take into account the fact that, in the 
veto treatment, many proposals were rejected. Actually, large agreements were frequently 
proposed and rejected, revealing the conflict between individual and group interest. While the 
realized agreements get clearly closer to the social optimum under the dictator treatment, the 
cooperative intentions are not necessarily weaker in the veto treatment. We analyse these 
intentions by looking at initial proposals at the beginning of each round. In Section 2 we 
pointed out that initial proposals are particularly interesting since they tend to reveal that the 
type of behaviours we described are consistent with three different proposals. For later 
proposals, which are influenced by the sequence of agreement formation, we compare the 
proposed agreement sizes to the predictions of Section 2.  
 
4.2.1 Initial proposals 
 
Result 6: In both treatments, the global agreement is the most frequently proposed agreement 
at the beginning of rounds, followed by the singleton.   
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We assume that initial proposals in each round provide an indication of subjects’ intentions to 
cooperate or to act strategically. Clearly the cooperative intention is the strongest. However 
since singletons are often formed, result 6 illustrates the conflict between collective and  
individual interests. Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of proposals ranked from the 
largest to the smallest agreement, at the beginning of each round. Clearly, the singleton (the 
smallest “agreement”) and the global agreement are the most frequently proposed agreements. 
For the veto treatment, 57% of the initial proposals are global agreements, and 25% are 
singletons. The corresponding frequencies for the dictator treatment are 45% and 32% 
respectively. Other agreement sizes have a very low frequency, except agreements of size 2 
which was proposed in the 12% of the cases in the dictator treatment.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
Although we decided to pool the data from the fixed and the randomly matched groups, it is 
worth mentioning that fixed groups behave more cooperatively than random groups, as can be 
seen from table 6. Global agreements are more frequent and singletons are less frequent in 
fixed groups than in random groups. We cannot test for significance however, since we have 
only two independent observations in the random treatments. Table 6 and figure 4 also show a 
difference in the cooperative intentions between the veto and the dictator treatments. Global 
agreements are more frequently proposed in the veto treatment, and singletons are less 
frequently proposed. We reject the null hypothesis of equal frequencies of global agreement 
proposals in initial rounds for the veto and the dictator treatments (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney, 
two-sided,  5%), and of equal frequencies of singletons (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney, two-sided,  
10%). 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
In the veto treatment 73.80% of the (non-singleton) initial proposals were rejected. Since 
agreement sizes between 2 and 6 were very rarely proposed at the beginning of rounds, 
rejection rates across agreement sizes cannot be compared. Furthermore larger agreements are 
more likely to be rejected, even if only a few subjects act myopically. Note that global 
agreements as initial proposals are less frequently rejected by fixed groups (62% rejected) 
than by random groups (81% rejected).  
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 Since the global agreement was the most frequently proposed and rejected agreement, of 
course a rejection was followed most of the time by a proposal of a smaller agreement. The 
rejection of the global agreement was frequently followed by the formation of a singleton6 
(more than 50% of the cases overall).  
 
4.2.2 Proposals in sub-games  
 
Table 7 gives the proportion of proposals for various sub-games. Each sub-game is 
characterized by the number of subjects who are not yet partners of an agreement (row 
numbers). For instance the row labelled 5 corresponds to situations in which the first two 
subjects have already signed a binding agreement, either an agreement of 2 subjects or two 
singletons. The possible agreement sizes in this example are 5, 4, 3 2 and 1. The last column 
of the table gives the percentage of “extreme” proposals, i.e. the largest possible agreement in 
the sub-game or a singleton. Obviously for each sub-game, the most frequently observed 
proposal is either the largest agreement of the remaining players or the singleton. Together, 
these two possible proposals represent at least 70% of all proposals in each sub-game and in 
each treatment.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
 
Table 8 shows the aggregated frequency of extreme proposals (singleton + largest agreement) 
for each sub-game and each independent subjects’ group. Table 9 (appendix) provides 
detailed frequencies about singletons and global agreements for each sub-game size and 
independent player group. Except for sub-game of size 3, the frequencies of extreme 
proposals are the same in both treatments (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney, 5%). In sub-games of 
size 3 only extreme agreements were proposed in the dictator treatment, while intermediate 
coalitions of size 2 emerged sometimes in most groups in the veto treatment.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
                                                 
6 In a few cases the rejection of the global agreement was followed by the same proposal.  
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Table 8 clearly shows that in all independent groups and for all sub-game sizes there is a 
strong tendency to propose extreme agreements, as predicted by Proposition 2. In order to test 
for significance of the observed tendency we use Selten’s (1991) measure of predictive 
success, S = h – a, where h is defined as the hit rate (frequency of compatible proposals) and 
a as the area (frequency of random compatible proposals). The area measures the possibility 
that extreme proposals could have been chosen randomly. For example, for sub-games of size 
5, if we assume that a subject who chooses randomly proposes each possible size with equal 
probability, there is a probability of 2/5 that he proposes a compatible agreement at random. 
Therefore we need to correct the hit rates associated with each sub-game size by the 
frequency of randomly chosen sizes. Of course a gets larger as sub-games get smaller, leading 
to S = 0 for sub-games of size 2. All measures of predictive success are significantly positive 
(Binomial test, one-sided, 5%) for each sub-game size of each treatment. We conclude 
therefore that extreme agreements are not proposed at random, but are intentionally proposed 
by subjects.  
 
5 Discussion  
 
5.1 Cooperation and free riding 
 
The results described in the previous section constitute strong evidence of the co-existence 
and combining of cooperative behaviour and an incentive to free ride. Indeed, we observed 
that the global agreement is the initial proposal in the majority of cases and the most frequent 
realized agreement. Furthermore, the largest agreement is, in each sub-game, the most 
frequent or the second most frequent proposal (after the singleton). All of which suggests 
cooperative behaviour. However, singletons appear with the highest frequency in all 
agreement structures, indicating that free-riding behaviour seems also to be widespread in our 
data. The proposal of a global agreement is very often rejected and most of the time this 
rejection is followed by the formation of a singleton. In each sub-game the singleton is the 
most frequent or the second most frequent proposal (after the largest agreement).  
 
We suggest that two forces are at work: the incentive to cooperate which drives the subjects to 
propose an agreement to all remaining potential partners and the incentive to free ride, which 
drives them to become singletons. The role of these two forces - an incentive to cooperate 
opposed to an incentive to free ride - was described in Ray and Vohra’s paper and in several 
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other papers demonstrating the inefficiency of binding agreements for solving the social 
dilemma. However in our experiment, the equilibrium predicted by Ray and Vohra, is never 
observed for the veto treatment and appears with a low frequency in the dictator treatment. 
The observed outcome for the veto treatment is even less efficient than predicted by the 
equilibrium. How can we interpret this difference from the theoretical result and this even 
greater inefficiency?  
 
 
5.2 Other assumptions about the subjects’ rationality 
 
 
In this section we try to determine which of the previous assumptions characterizing R&V’s 
behaviour, correspond to a bad predictor for our subjects’ behaviour?  
 
5.2.1 Cooperative players 
 
First, let us consider the case where the players are farsighted (A2) and believe in a common 
rationality (A3) but are not selfish. Since these players want to maximize the sum of the 
payoffs,  we will define them as cooperative.  
 
Assumption A1’: The objective of a cooperative player is to maximize the sum of all players’ 
payoffs. 
 
What would constitute an equilibrium under the foregoing assumptions? Consider a group T 
of players. Whatever the organization of the rest of the population N\T, the sum of payoffs is 
always higher if players in T sign a unique agreement than if they sign two distinct 
agreements, whatever this partition of T into two agreements is. Consider that , 
this can be verified simply by comparing the sum of payoffs of players in T when   and  
are disjoint: 
ji SST ∪=
iS jS
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )3322
2
1))/((,...,,..., jijijijijijjjiii ssssssTNBgssssusssus +−++++=+  
and when they are joint:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )32
2
1))/((,...,... jijijijijijjjiii ssssssTNBgssssusssus +−++++=+++ . 
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Obviously the latter sum is greater than the first, whatever the sizes  and  . Using 
backward induction, this leads to the result that, in each sub-game , the first player 
to make a proposal proposes a unique agreement to the t remaining players. If a cooperative 
player has to respond to a proposal, for the same reason, she will accept to sign an agreement 
involving all the remaining players and will reject every other proposal in order to propose 
this agreement herself. Therefore, the following Proposition holds: 
is js
(i TNBG / )
 
Proposition 1: If all players are cooperative, at equilibrium the largest agreement is proposed 
and signed in each sub-game and hence, the global agreement is proposed and signed 
immediately.  
 
5.2.2 Myopic players 
In this sub-section we keep assumptions A1 and A3 but instead of farsightedness (assumption 
A2 ), we assume that players are myopic. How would myopic players behave in this game? In 
general, myopic behaviour is understood as to be the behaviour of a player who takes his 
decision by reacting to the existing situation without anticipating the other players’ reactions 
to his own choice. Given that she anticipates no response, she plays her best response. In our 
framework, however, myopic behaviour has to be defined more carefully for two reasons. The 
first reason is that the behaviour will depend on the player’s position at the outset. Does she 
have to make a proposal or to respond to a proposal? But the behaviour depends also on the 
myopic players’ conjectures when they consider the consequences of their choices. Indeed, in 
our framework, it is not realistic that myopic players have no conjectures at all. They do have 
conjectures but myopic conjectures. In order to define precisely myopic behaviour, we take 
into account the player’s position in the game and her conjecture.  
 
Myopic behaviour is characterized by the following assumptions A2’: 
• A player who makes a proposal does not anticipate the possibility of subsequent 
counter-proposals by other players.   
• A player who has to respond to a proposal does not anticipate any other counter-
proposal, except her own counter-proposal if she decides to reject. 
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What would constitute an equilibrium under these assumptions? The first player to make a 
proposal chooses the coalition size which maximizes her payoff as a member. Therefore, in 
each sub-game , her objective is to solve: (i TNBG / )
( ) 22
2
1
iiiis sstsBguMax i −−++=  
The solution to this program is always to propose the coalition of the t remaining players in 
the sub-game. If a myopic player has to respond to a proposal, for the same reason she will 
accept a coalition of all the remaining players and will reject every other proposal in order to 
propose herself that coalition. Obviously, if all the players are myopic, the global agreement is 
proposed and signed immediately, like in the case where all players are cooperative, 
 
Proposition 2: If all players are myopic, at the equilibrium the largest agreement is proposed 
and signed in each sub-game and the global agreement is proposed and signed immediately.  
 
5.2.3 An alternative to homogeneity 
Let us turn now to assumption A3. How is the equilibrium modified when players consider 
that the population is not homogeneous? For example, consider a selfish and farsighted 
player. In a homogeneous population, it may be that his equilibrium strategy is to propose a 
sub-agreement in a given sub-game. In this case, the formation of a singleton is not the best 
strategy because the remaining players would be induced to sign several agreements. Now, 
assume that this farsighted player believes that all other players are either myopic or 
cooperative. Then, she believes that she has the opportunity to stand alone in a singleton while 
all remaining players will sign an agreement, which corresponds to the most beneficial 
situation for her. Call this player a free rider.  The free rider thinks that he is more “clever” 
than the other players. 
 
Assumption A3’: A free rider is a selfish farsighted player who believes that all the other 
players are cooperative or myopic. 
   
In each sub-game , the free rider believes that the remaining players will sign an 
agreement and she maximizes: 
(i TNBG / )
( ) ( ) 222
2
1
iiiis sstsBguMax i −−++=  
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As a result, she refuses every proposal and always proposes the singleton. Then, if k players 
are free riders and n – k myopic or cooperative, the following result holds:  
 
Proposition 3: If k players are free riders and n – k are myopic or cooperative, at the 
equilibrium the agreement structure is formed by k singletons, which form first, followed by 
the signature by n – k players of the unique agreement.  
 
This was the simplest case to consider. We could also have allowed the players’ conjectures 
to evolve. For example, myopic players could become free riders or free riders could learn 
that there are not isolated. While the characterization of such an equilibrium would be 
interesting, although much more complex because of incomplete information, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to investigate such an issue. All we wanted to show is that if the players’ 
behaviours correspond to one or the other of the three types described previously, the only 
proposals would be, in each sub-game, the singleton or an agreement signed by all the 
remaining players. This prediction is close to what we observed in sub-section 4.2.2. 
 
Proposition 2: If the players are either cooperative, myopic or free riders, in each sub-game 
each proposal is either the singleton or the largest agreement. 
 
The following table summarizes, for each type of behaviour, the proposals at the equilibrium 
in the different sub-games in the case of a population of seven players. Note that, a player 
who adopts R&V’s behaviour is only differentiated by her action in sub-games with 7 players 
left. Then, the R&V’s player proposes an agreement of size 2, while the free rider becomes a 
singleton (1) and the cooperative or myopic player proposes the global agreement (GA). In 
sub-games of size 6, a R&V’s player acts like a free rider and becomes a singleton. The 
cooperative or myopic players propose the largest agreement (LA). In sub-games with 5 or 
less players left, R&V’s player acts like a myopic or cooperative player and she proposes the 
largest agreement of the remaining players. The formation of singletons in these sub-games is 
only consistent with the free rider rationality.  
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 R&V’s behaviour Myopic or 
Cooperative behaviour 
Free rider 
7 2 LA (GA) 1 
6 1 LA 1 
5 and fewer LA LA 1 
 
Table 1: Proposals depending on behaviour type and sub-game 
 
  
Of course, this shows that, in all proper sub-games with less than seven subjects, we cannot 
distinguish between R&V’s behaviour and other types of behaviours. However, even when 
the subjects’ proposals coincide with R&V’s equilibrium proposal, they might be generated 
by a mix of different behaviours. Our data shows that subjects’ initial proposals differ from 
the proposal predicted by R&V’s behaviour. The global agreement and the singleton appear 
with a high frequency as first proposals. Furthermore, we observe proposals of the largest 
agreement in sub-games of size six and singletons formed in sub-games of size five and 
fewer. Such proposals are compatible with the three alternative types of behaviour that we 
described : cooperative, myopic and “basic” free riding.  
 
Obviously other sorts of behaviour could coincide with observed proposals. For example, we 
will discuss below the question of reciprocity. However, the important point here is the 
difficulty generated by this multiplicity of behaviours. An interpretation of the result above is 
that the subjects do not play the Nash equilibrium because they have difficulties coordinating. 
They know that their potential partners do not necessarily behave in the same way. At the 
beginning, a very careful selfish farsighted subject would try to free ride with a proposal to 
sign an agreement with only one another partner. However, a cooperative subject would not 
accept a sub-agreement of two partners if other potential partners are still available. As an 
argument in favour of this interpretation, in the dictatorial treatment in which this incomplete 
information is partially solved because the subjects do not have to speculate about the 
possible counter proposals to their proposals, R&V’s equilibrium was observed, though with a 
very low frequency.  
 
The main question is to understand how the subjects get round this problem of incomplete 
information. We try to give an answer to this question in what follows.  
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 5.3 Non-maximizing behaviour 
  
 5.3.1 Inequity aversion 
 
The analysis of proposals in sub-games provides strong evidence that subjects focus on two 
extreme proposals: the coalition of all remaining subjects and the singleton. While we 
provided several possible behavioural hypotheses that are consistent with the observed 
patterns, other hypotheses could be suggested. In particular, if subjects are concerned not only 
by their individual payoff, but also by other players’s payoff, they could act in a way that is 
consistent with our data. If subjects dislike inequalities, as proposed in the seminal models 
proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2001), subjects have an 
incentive to reach “symmetric” agreement structures. Indeed, an interesting finding in our 
experiment is that the frequency of appearance of agreement structures is correlated with the 
Gini index which measures payoff disparities between coalitions of players. Agreement 
structures with low payoff disparity among members are more likely to emerge.  
 
Another non-maximizing behaviour is often observed in these experiments on voluntary 
contributions. Subjects use contributions to send signals to their partners or to react to their 
partners’ contributions. Keser & van Winden (2000) say that subjects appear to contribute 
“conditionally”. We explain in what follows that this can play an important role in our 
experiment as well, but with a different outcome.  
 
5.3.2 Another game 
 
Another explanation for the fact that our subjects do not play the Nash equilibrium of R&V’s 
game could be that they are not playing the same game. It may be that the subjects “simplify” 
the game and think just in terms of two actions: “cooperation” or “defection”. Indeed, the 
proposal of an agreement could be interpreted as an intention to cooperate, rather than a tool 
in order to “free ride efficiently”. Subjects who want to free ride would therefore choose a 
singleton in order to “defect”. In this interpretation, each subject chooses between two 
actions:  
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1) the subject proposes the largest agreement of the available partners in each sub-game 
when she wants to “cooperate” or   
2) the subject forms the singleton when she wants to “defect”. 
In this simplified game, payoffs are given in the following Table: 
INSERT Table 11 
Note that, for the alternative rationalities Cooperative, Myopic and Free Rider the results of 
Section 5.2 are unchanged. However under assumptions A1, A2 and A3 characterizing Ray 
and Vohra’s rationality the equilibrium structure is (1,1,5). In the experiment, (1,1,5) appears 
with a low frequency (see Figure 3) but we observed in Section 4 that the quasi totality of 
structures to appear are composed with a unique non trivial agreement and singletons.   
 
We would like to highlight the peculiarities of this simplified game. Consider a subject A who 
has chosen to be cooperative but whose proposal of the largest agreement has been rejected by 
a potential partner P. A cannot be forced to be in a less favourable position than subject P who 
decided to free ride and became a singleton. In the experiment, subject A can always be, at the 
end of the round, in the same position as the free rider. She can simply decide to become a 
singleton as well. As a consequence, a cooperative subject could never lose in comparison 
with a selfish subject, by playing a strategy Tit for Tat. Defection is less frustrating for 
cooperators. This may explain that the global agreement is the most frequent first proposal 
(Result ?). Furthermore, in an experiment, this “costlessness” of proposals to cooperate is true 
till the last round. This may explain that we do not observe any “end-effect”7. On the contrary, 
it is said in Result 4 that the frequency of appearance of the global agreement increases during 
sessions of our experiment and with it, the average performance. It seems that the subjects 
“learn to play cooperative”. Many singletons are formed in the first rounds but the frequency 
of the global agreement increases in the last rounds.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have explored the capacity of binding agreements to mitigate the social 
dilemma which arises in pure public good provision. In our experiments, the subjects have the 
                                                 
7 We refer to the well known stylised fact obtained in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good 
such that that subjects “learn to play Nash”. They start contributing a lot but then, they adjust their contributions 
to the equilibrium level. 
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possibility to sign binding agreements, which guarantee the collective optimum for them and 
their partners. The global agreement, which corresponds to the collective optimum for the 
whole group is frequently proposed, especially in the first round, but it is also very frequently 
rejected in the veto treatment. However, the frequency of realization of the global agreement 
increases over time. Therefore, on one hand our data provide an optimistic point of view on 
the capacity of binding agreements to mitigate the social dilemma. On the other hand, we also 
observe contrary evidence, since the singleton is the second most frequently realized 
“agreement”. 
 
A central result of the literature on endogenous formation of coalition is that binding 
agreements do not necessarily lead to an efficient outcome. In the model proposed by Ray and 
Vohra (2001), the players have the possibility to sign binding agreements to contribute to a 
public good. They show that the incentive to sign large agreements in order to “internalize” 
the positive externality does not eliminate the incentive to free ride. Their message is that the 
incentive to free ride is not solved by the signature of binding agreements because it is shifted 
from the individual level to the group level. In an example with seven players, the equilibrium 
agreement structure is formed by an agreement of two players and another one of five players. 
The smaller agreement is signed before the larger one and its partners free ride on the partners 
of the latter to obtain a larger benefit. 
 
Our experiment lends partial support to this description, but the two driving forces of this 
process are somehow exacerbated in our data. Indeed, we observe that subjects have an 
incentive to cooperate by proposing an agreement to all the available partners, but at the same 
time they also have a strong incentive to free ride and stay as singletons. However, the 
theoretical equilibrium as described by Ray and Vohra is never observed in the veto treatment 
and appears with a low frequency in the dictator treatment. As a consequence, the result is 
even more inefficient in our veto treatment than at the equilibrium predicted by the theory. 
We give two interpretations for this. The first interpretation is that the subjects have 
difficulties to coordinate because they know that their potential partners do not have 
necessarily the same rationality. The other explanation, which is or is not a consequence of 
the first problem of incomplete information, is that the subjects “simplify” the game and just 
think in terms of two actions: “cooperation” or “defection”, as in a multi-person prisoner 
dilemma game. Indeed, the analysis of proposals in sub-games provides strong evidence that 
the subject focus on two extreme choices: the largest agreement of all the available partners or 
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the singleton. The proposal of an agreement is associated with cooperation and it does not 
seem that the subjects free ride in groups.  
 
The last main result concerns the evolution of the outcome during each session. It seems that 
the frequency of appearance of the global agreement increases during the session and with it, 
the average performance. This is in contradiction with the well known stylized fact obtained 
in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good which is interpreted as a subjects’ 
ability to “learn to play Nash”. They start contributing a lot but then, adjust their contributions 
to the equilibrium level. In our experiment where the subjects have to sign binding 
agreements to contribute, it seems that the opposite occurs and that the subjects “learn to play 
cooperative”. Many singletons are formed in the first rounds but the frequency of the global 
agreement increases in the last rounds. We give an interpretation related to the peculiarity of 
the game simplified by the subjects.. On the one hand, because the subjects have to make 
proposals, cooperation is contingent and can be used as a signal to other subjects with no cost 
till the end of the session. On the other hand, it is so difficult to “free ride efficiently” that 
defectors can be converted to cooperation. 
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Session 
number 
Group  Number of 
rounds 
Number of 
proposals 
Veto / 
Dictator 
Random / 
Fixed 
2 V1 13 140 veto random 
3 V2 8 49 veto fixed 
3 V3 8 67 veto fixed 
4 V4 11 76 veto fixed 
4 V5 11 65 veto fixed 
5 V6 14 173 veto random 
6 V7 10 48 veto fixed 
6 V8 10 84 veto fixed 
7 D9 15 25 dictator fixed 
7 D10 15 28 dictator fixed 
8 D11 10 48 dictator random 
9 D12 10 40 dictator random 
10 D13 15 33 dictator fixed 
11 D14 15 29 dictator fixed 
11 D15 15 27 dictator fixed 
 
 
Table 1 : Experimental design 
 
 
 
# Structure s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 Total 
payoff 
1 (7) 24,50       172,00 
(1,6) 36,50 19,00      151,00 
(2,5) 27,00 16,50      137,00 
 
2 
(4,3) 20,50 17,00      130,00 
(1,1,5) 26,50 26,50 14,50     126,00 
(1,2,4) 20,50 19,00 13,00     110,50 
(1,3,3) 18,50 14,50 14,50     106,00 
3 
(2,2,3) 15,00 15,00 12,50     97,50 
(1,1,1,4) 18,50 18,50 18,50 11,00    99,50 
(1,1,2,3) 14,50 14,50 13,00 10,50    86,50 
 
4 
(1,2,2,2) 12,50 11,00 11,00 11,00    78,50 
(1,1,1,1,3) 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 8,50   75,50  
5 (1,1,1,2,2) 10,50 10,50 10,50 9,00 9,00   67,50 
 (1,1,1,1,1,2) 8,50 8,50 8,50 8,50 8,50 7,00  56,50 
7 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1) 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 45,50 
 
 
Table 2 : Individual and total payoff according to the agreement structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement 
structure 
Total 
payoff 
Gini 
index 
Veto dictator 
(7) 172.00 0.0000 0.2857 0.4609 
(1,6) 151.00 0.0997 0.0446 0.1217 
(2,5) 137.00 0.1099 0.0000 0.0957 
(4,3) 130.00 0.0451 0.0000 0.0348 
(1,1,5) 126.00 0.1366 0.0714 0.1043 
(1,2,4) 110.50 0.1047 0.0179 0.0174 
(1,3,3) 106.00 0.0325 0.0268 0.0000 
(2,2,3) 97.50 0.0440 0.0000 0.0087 
(1,1,1,4) 99.50 0.1292 0.0982 0.0696 
(1,1,2,3) 86.50 0.0743 0.0357 0.0522 
(1,2,2,2) 78.50 0.0164 0.0089 0.0261 
(1,1,1,1,3) 75.50 0.0908 0.0804 0.0000 
(1,1,1,2,2) 67.50 0.0381 0.1071 0.0000 
(1,1,1,1,1,2) 56.50 0.0379 0.1339 0.0087 
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1) 45.50 0.0000 0.0893 0.0000 
 
Table 4 : frequency of agreement structure according to the Gini coefficient 
     
 
Source |       SS       df       MS                  Number of obs =      15 
---------+------------------------------               F(  3,    11) =    2.09 
   Model |  .028273687     3  .009424562               Prob > F      =  0.1600 
Residual |  .049658446    11  .004514404               R-squared     =  0.3628 
---------+------------------------------               Adj R-squared =  0.1890 
   Total |  .077932134    14  .005566581               Root MSE      =  .06719 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
freqveto |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
totalpay |   .0003446   .0005302      0.650   0.529      -.0008224    .0015117 
    gini |  -3.338544    1.50256     -2.222   0.048      -6.645656   -.0314319 
   gini2 |   20.45931   10.92963      1.872   0.088      -3.596641    44.51526 
   _cons |   .1216331   .0665864      1.827   0.095      -.0249226    .2681887 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Regression veto 
 
 
 
Source |       SS       df       MS                  Number of obs =      15 
---------+------------------------------               F(  3,    11) =   12.05 
   Model |  .146053323     3  .048684441               Prob > F      =  0.0008 
Residual |  .044458753    11  .004041705               R-squared     =  0.7666 
---------+------------------------------               Adj R-squared =  0.7030 
   Total |  .190512076    14  .013608005               Root MSE      =  .06357 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 freqdic |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
totalpay |   .0024618   .0005017      4.907   0.000       .0013576     .003566 
    gini |  -4.181379   1.421719     -2.941   0.013      -7.310562   -1.052195 
   gini2 |   24.76188   10.34159      2.394   0.036       2.000188    47.52358 
   _cons |  -.0676457   .0630039     -1.074   0.306      -.2063164    .0710249 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Regression dict 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 : analysis of total payoff and payoff disparity 
 
 
 
 
 All periods 3 final periods 
Global agreement 
0,2857 0,4333
at least 3 singleton 
0,5089 0,4000
others 
0,2054 0,1667
 
(a) Veto 
 
 
 
 All periods 3 final periods 
Global agreement 0,4609
0,5556
at least 3 singleton 0,0783
0,0741
others 0,4609
0,3704
 
(b) Dictator 
 
 
Table 3 : Aggregated frequencies of types of agreement structures 
 
 Type Complete singleton 
Fixed 63.79 17.24 
Veto 
Random 50.00 33.33 
Fixed 50.67 30.67 
dictator 
Random 35.00 35.00 
 
 
Table 6 : Comparison of initial proposals of extreme agreements for fixed and random groups 
 
 Subgame Size   
Remaining  
players 
 
7 
 
6 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
Total Compatible 
Proposals 
7 0.422 0.055 0.042 0.025 0.055 0.101 0.300 237 171 (0.722) 
6 - 0.366 0.030 0.015 0.075 0.097 0.418 134 105 (0.784) 
5 - - 0.375 0.042 0.021 0.083 0.479 96 82 (0.854) 
4 - - - 0.372 0.053 0.181 0.394 94 72 (0.766) 
3 - - - - 0.382 0.147 0.471 68 58 (0.853) 
Total 629 488 (0.776) 
 
(a) veto treatment 
 
 
 Subgame Size   
Remaining  
players 
 
7 
 
6 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
Total Compatible 
proposals 
7 0.461 0.026 0.043 0.026 0.009 0.122 0.313 115 89 (0.774) 
6 - 0.306 0.111 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.528 36 30 (0.833) 
5 - - 0.424 0.061 0.030 0.152 0.333 33 25 (0.757 
4 - - - 0.750 0.083 0.167 0.000 12 9 (0.750) 
3 - - - - 0.600 0.000 0.400 10 10 (1.000) 
Total 206 163 (0.791) 
 
(b) dictator treatment 
 
Table 7: Proposals and compatible proposals in sub-games (in % of all proposals)  
(N.B. subgames of sizes 1 and 2 are omitted because they are necessarily compatible) 
 
 
 
Group 7 6 5 4 3 
V1 0.9024 0.8438 0.7917 1.0000 1.0000 
V2 0.7778 0.8889 0.8889 0.8333 1.0000 
V3 0.4400 0.6364 0.6667 0.7778 0.6667 
V4 0.8333 0.6923 0.9167 0.7857 0.8000 
V5 0.7500 1.0000 0.7778 0.5385 0.8000 
V6 0.6964 0.7381 0.8636 0.6957 0.9286 
V7 0.6818 0.6364 0.8333 1.0000 0.7500 
V8 0.6757 1.0000 1.0000 0.7692 0.8182 
Mean 0.7197 0.8045 0.8423 0.8000 0.8454 
 
(a) veto treatment 
 
 
 
Group 7 6 5 4 3 
D9 0.9333 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
D10 0.8667 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667  
D11 0.8000 0.7000 0.5714  1.0000 
D12 0.6000 0.7500 0.6667 1.0000 1.0000 
D13 0.6667 0.6667 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 
D14 0.6000 1.0000 0.8333 0.5000 1.0000 
D15 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667 1.0000 1.0000 
Mean 0.7810 0.8738 0.7840 0.7778 1.0000 
 
(a) dictator treatment 
 
Table 8 : Proposals of extreme agreements (in %) for each subgame size and each 
independent group 
 
 
7 6 5 4 3 Group 
Global Single Largest Single Largest Single Largest Single Largest Single 
V1 0.4634 0.4390 0.3750 0.4688 0.3333 0.4583 0.3077 0.6923 0.3000 0.7000 
V2 0.5556 0.2222 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.5000 0.3333 0.0000 1.0000 
V3 0.2400 0.2000 0.4545 0.1818 0.3333 0.3333 0.2222 0.5556 0.2222 0.4444 
V4 0.3889 0.4444 0.1538 0.5385 0.3333 0.5833 0.3571 0.4286 0.5000 0.3000 
V5 0.4500 0.3000 0.1429 0.8571 0.2222 0.5556 0.3846 0.1538 0.4000 0.4000 
V6 0.3393 0.3571 0.4048 0.3333 0.3636 0.5000 0.3478 0.3478 0.3571 0.5714 
V7 0.5000 0.1818 0.4545 0.1818 0.6667 0.1667 0.6667 0.3333 0.5000 0.2500 
V8 0.5135 0.1622 0.3333 0.6667 0.4545 0.5455 0.3077 0.4615 0.5455 0.2727 
 
(a) veto treatment 
 
7 6 5 4 3 Group 
Global Single Largest Single Largest Single Largest Single Largest Single 
D9 0.7333 0.2000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
D10 0.6000 0.2667 0.2500 0.7500 0.2500 0.7500 0.6667 0.0000 - - 
D11 0.3000 0.5000 0.2000 0.5000 0.5714 0.0000 - - 0.5000 0.5000 
D12 0.4000 0.2000 0.2500 0.5000 0.5000 0.1667 1.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 
D13 0.2667 0.4000 0.5000 0.1667 0.5000 0.2500 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
D14 0.4667 0.1333 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.3333 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
D15 0.5333 0.4667 0.5714 0.4286 0.3333 0.3333 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
 
(b) dictator treatment 
 
Table 9 : Hit rates per independent group of singletons and largest agreement proposals  
 
 
Group 7 6 5 4 3 
v1 0.6167 0.5104 0.3917 0.5000 0.3333 
v2 0.4921 0.5556 0.4889 0.3333 0.3333 
v3 0.1543 0.3030 0.2667 0.2778 -0.0238 
v4 0.5476 0.3590 0.5167 0.2857 0.1333 
v5 0.4643 0.6667 0.3778 0.0385 0.1333 
v6 0.4107 0.4048 0.4636 0.1957 0.2619 
v7 0.3961 0.3030 0.4333 0.5000 0.0833 
v8 0.3900 0.6667 0.6000 0.2692 0.1515 
      
Mean 0.4340 0.4711 0.4423 0.3000 0.1758 
 
(a) veto treatment 
 
Group 7 6 5 4 3 
D9 0.6476 0.6667 0.6000 0.5000 0.3333 
D10 0.5810 0.6667 0.6000 0.1667  
D11 0.5143 0.3667 0.1714  0.3333 
D12 0.3143 0.4167 0.2667 0.5000 0.3333 
D13 0.3810 0.3333 0.3500 0.0000 0.3333 
D14 0.3143 0.6667 0.4333 0.0000 0.3333 
D15 0.7143 0.6667 0.2667 0.5000 0.3333 
      
Mean 0.4952 0.5405 0.3840 0.2381 0.2857 
 
(b) dictator treatment 
 
Table 10 : Measures of predictive success for extreme agreements 
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Figure 1 : Cumulative frequencies of agreement sizes : veto (2a), dictator (2b) 
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Figure 2 : Size distribution : comparison veto and dictator treatments 
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Figure 3 : Frequency of agreements 
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Figure 4 : Frequency distribution of initial proposals (all rounds) 
 
 Structure s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 Total 
payoff 
(7) 24,50       172,00 
(1,6) 36,50 19,00      151,00 
(1,1,5) 26,50 26,50 14,50     126,00 
(1,1,1,4) 18,50 18,50 18,50 11,00    99,50 
(1,1,1,1,3) 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 8,50   75,50 
(1,1,1,1,1,2) 8,50 8,50 8,50 8,50 8,50 7,00  56,50 
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1) 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 45,50 
 
Table 11 : Payoffs in the simplified game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
